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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (2) (j) pursuant to an Order of the 
Utah Supreme Court entered November 1, 2010. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
POINT I. Appeal of the Judgment and Underlying Orders is 
Properly Before This Court. 
POINT II. Under the Clear and Unambiguous Terms of the 
ME&LS Operating Agreement, Dale Bennett Did Not 
Terminate His Employment with the Company 
(ME&LS) So Is Still a Member of ME&LS. 
POINT III. The Relevant Language of the Operating 
Agreement Is Not Ambiguous and the Intentions 
of the Parties Are Clear from a Plain Reading 
of the Operating Agreement. 
POINT IV. Plaintiffs' Position Ignores the Clear Language 
of the Operating Agreement and Unnecessarily 
Relies on Irrelevant Facts Outside the 
Operating Agreement. 
POINT V. Proper Construction of the Clear Language of 
the Operating Agreement Does Not Lead to Absurd 
Results or to Nullification of its Terms. 
v 
POINT VI. Plaintiffs1 Attempt to Restructure the 
Operating Agreement, Without Notice to Bennett, 
Is Invalid and a Violation of Judge Boyden1s 
Previously Announced Order. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiffs filed this suit, claiming, among other 
things, that the resignation of Dale K. Bennett ("Bennett") 
as an "employee" of McNeil Engineering, Inc. ("MEI") 
automatically constituted a "withdrawal" by him as a 
"member" of McNeil Engineering & Land Surveying, LLC 
("ME&LS"). Following briefing and argument on the parties' 
Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, Judge Ann 
Boyden ruled that Bennett remains a member of ME&LS and is 
entitled to all of the benefits of a member. Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Reconsider was denied by Judge Pat Brian. 
Thereafter the District Court, Judge Brian, entered a 
Judgment in favor of Bennett for Bennett's unpaid 
percentage share of ME&LS distributions for 2005 and 2006. 
This Court held that the judgment had not been properly 
certified for appeal and the first appeal was dismissed. 
Upon remand ME&LS filed a Motion to Revise Orders and 
Judgment that was denied by Judge Dever. Also upon remand, 
vi 
Bennett filed his Motion to Enforce Judgment that was 
granted. 
Thereafter Bennett filed a Motion for Certification, 
joined in by ME&LS, that Judge Boyden's judgment is final 
for purposes of Rule 54(b) and for appeal that was granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Scott F. McNeil ("McNeil") formed McNeil 
Engineering, Inc. ("MEI") in 1983, and since has been the 
sole owner of MEI. (R.1168) 
2. Upon its formation, Bennett became an employee of 
MEI and remained an employee of MEI from 1983 until he 
resigned as an employee of that company on August 17, 2005. 
(R.1187; R.6630) 
3. In 1996, McNeil formed three limited liability 
companies associated with MEI to perform the engineering 
and surveying services to its clients theretofore carried 
on by MEI itself. ME&LS was one of the three LLCs created. 
(R.1169-1170, 1173; R.6627) 
4. MEI remained the employer of all personnel and 
leased them to ME&LS and to the other two companies. 
(R.1178) MEI also provided administrative services through 
its staff employees for all of the companies. (R.1175-
vii 
1177; R.6628) MEI has provided no engineering or surveying 
services since 1996. (R.1174) 
5. Bennett became a 25% member owner of ME&LS at its 
inception in 1996 and thereafter rendered services on ME&LS 
projects as a leased "employee" of and for MEI. (R.6628) 
In 2005 Bennett owned 252 shares for a total of 26.53% of 
the membership interest in ME&LS. (R.6618) 
6. Both McNeil and Bennett were members and managers, 
but never employees, of ME&LS. (R.6601) In fact, ME&LS 
has never had any employees. All services on ME&LS 
projects were provided to ME&LS by leased employees of MEI 
working for MEI, not for ME&LS, on work of ME&LS. (R.1178; 
R.6628, emphasis added.) 
7. Both McNeil and Bennett understood from the 
beginning that Bennett was an employee of MEI. (R.1175; 
R.5445) 
8. MEI provided and paid for all of the services 
required of an employer to all of its employees, including 
Bennett. (R.5444-5445) These included things such as 
salary, bonuses, insurance, office, secretarial help, 
internet, telephone, automobile and professional 
association membership, etc. 
viii 
9. An Amendment No. 2, dated November 1, 2001, to the 
Operating Agreement ("Operating Agreement") of ME&LS 
provided in Sec 12.1 that a member 
"shall cease to be a member . . . upon the 
withdrawal of a member," 
and in Section 12.3 that 
"a member shall be deemed to withdraw when the 
member voluntarily resigns or terminates the 
member' s employment with the Company for reasons 
other than bankruptcy, death, disability or 
incompetence." (R.6618-21, emphasis added.) 
10. Under definitions of the ME&LS Operating 
Agreement, in Section 1.10, the "Company" is defined as 
"McNeil Engineering and Land Surveying, L.C., a 
liability company formed under the laws of Utah, 
and any successor company." Id. 
11. MEI is not referred to in either the ME&LS 
Operating Agreement or in Amendment No. 1 or Amendment No. 
2, nor is there any definition of "employment," "employee" 
or "withdrawal." There is also no reference to the term 
"leased employee." 
12. On August 17, 2005, Bennett submitted a letter to 
McNeil stating that he was resigning his employment with 
MEI. (R.2600-2601) Bennett did nothing to withdraw from, 
sell or otherwise give up his valuable ownership interest 
in ME&LS. Nor was there any reason why he should do so. 
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13. In August, 2006, the parties filed cross motions 
for summary judgment on Bennett's status as a member of 
ME&LS and his rights, if any, as a member. (R. 2510-2581; 
R.2585-2644) 
14. On November 17, 2006, Judge Boyden ruled that 
Bennett is still a member of ME&LS and is entitled to: 
"All of the rights of a member, including, for 
example, the same right to current information, 
accounting, disbursements, and other benefits that 
any other member of ME&LS is entitled to receive." 
(R.3119-22) That ruling was confirmed by Judge Boyden's 
Order dated December 21, 2006. Id. 
15. None of the documents related to ME&LS had ever 
referred to MEI until an Amendment No. 4 was purportedly 
adopted unilaterally on November 29, 2006, without notice 
to or approval of Bennett, just twelve days after Judge 
Boyden's ruling on November 17, 2006. (R.5772-75) 
16. Amendment No. 4 is a clear attempt to overrule and 
void Judge Boyden's Order. Amendment No. 4 omitted Bennett 
as a member and his membership interest was transferred to 
McNeil and the other members of ME&LS without consideration 
to Bennett. 
17. Appellants filed a motion to reconsider Judge 
Boyden's Order which was denied by Judge Brian on April 2, 
2008. (R.6791-6793) 
18. During the year 2005, ME&LS made distributions to 
members totaling $320,136.10. These distributions were 
paid out quarterly. In January 2005, a distribution of 
$100,000 was paid, and Bennett was paid $26,526.32, or 
26.53%. In April 2005, a distribution of $90,000 was paid 
and Bennett was paid $23,873.68, or 26.53%. In September 
2005, a distribution of $30,136.10 was paid. In November 
2005, a distribution of $100,000 was paid. Bennett was not 
paid his share of either the September or November 
distributions. (See Yearly General Ledger Detail Report. 
Bates numbered ME 0009934, attached as Exhibit 2.) (R.6432-
6433) 
19. During the year 2006, ME&LS made distributions to 
members totaling $405,740.40. In February 2006, a 
distribution of $105,740.40 was paid. In April 2006, a 
distribution of $90,000 was paid. In July 2005, a 
distribution of $100,000 was paid. In October 2005, a 
distribution of $100,000 was paid. Bennett was not paid 
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his share of any of the distributions paid to all the other 
members during 2 006. Id. 
20. In January, 2007, Bennett filed a Motion for Order 
of Judgment seeking an order requiring payment to him of 
his unpaid share of ME&LS distributions for 2005 and 2006 
in the amount of $142,974.42. (R.6432-6435) Id. 
21. On December 21, 2006, Judge Boyden granted that 
motion subject only to an accounting as to what funds 
Bennett had received and what he had not received. 
(R.6421-6427) 
22. On April 3, 2008, following briefing and oral 
argument, Judge Brian entered an Order and Judgment in 
favor of Bennett in the amount of $142,174.93, representing 
Bennett's share of unpaid distributions in 2005 and 2006. 
The Court also found that there was no just reason for 
delaying entry of the judgment and certified the judgment 
as final. (R.6791-6793) 
23. ME&LS filed its first Notice of Appeal and this 
Court dismissed the appeal because it was not properly 
certified as final for purposes of appeal. (Attachment 1 -
Court of Appeals Decision.) 
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24. Thereafter, Bennett filed his Motion for 
Certification, joined in by ME&LS, that Judge Brian's Order 
and Judgment on April 3, 2008 was final for purposes of 
appeal and that was granted on October 19, 2010. 
(Attachment 2 - Order Granting Certification, including 
findings.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
During the time Bennett was an employee of MEI from 
1996 until he resigned as an employee on August 17, 2005, 
MEI provided to him all of the services and support usually 
provided by an employer to its employees. 
Bennett has never been an employee of ME&LS. ME&LS has 
provided no employer support or services to Bennett. In 
fact, ME&LS, as structured by McNeil, has never had any 
employees. 
McNeil's contention that Bennett's status and 
termination of employment as an "employee of MEI" somehow 
automatically constitutes his "withdrawal as a member of 
ME&LS" is a forced and strained construction beyond any 
reasonable interpretation of the terms of the ME&LS 
Operating Agreement. Bennett's work was performed for, and 
as an employee of MEI, on tasks MEI undertook for ME&LS. 
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Three judges of the District Court properly ruled, 
following full briefing and argument on three separate 
occasions, that the ME&LS Operating Agreement is 
unambiguous and that Bennett remains a member of ME&LS. 
The District Court properly entered the Order and 
Judgment in the amount of unpaid member distributions for 
2005 and 2006 because McNeil did not have a right to offset 
uncertain, unproven, disputed and unliquidated claims 
against the distributions Bennett should have received. 
The District Court's second determination that there was no 
just reason for delay was proper under the facts of this 
case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. APPEAL OF THE JUDGMENT AND UNDERLYING ORDERS IS 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
This appeal is taken by ME&LS from both the Judgment 
and the underlying Orders of 2010, December 21, 2006, April 
2, 2008, and October 19, 2010. The Judgment was certified 
as final upon remand under Rule 56(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure by the District Court, and it was 
determined that "there is no just reason for delay." 
This second appeal meets the three requirements set' out 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State 
1 
Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1991), and the 
decision of this Court in the prior appeal. First, there 
are "multiple claims for relief" by "multiple parties" to 
this action. Second, "the Judgment and certification 
entered would otherwise have been appealable absent the 
other claims," and the District Court made a determination 
"that there is no just reason for delay" of the appeal. 
POINT II. UNDER THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS OF THE 
ME&LS OPERATING AGREEMENT, DALE BENNETT DID NOT 
TERMINATE HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH THE COMPANY 
(ME&LS) SO IS STILL A MEMBER OF ME&LS. 
Under the unambiguous wording of the ME&LS Operating 
Agreement, in order to withdraw as a member, Bennett had to 
resign his "employment" with or withdraw from ME&LS. The 
unwarranted interpretation plaintiffs attempt to apply to 
the ME&LS Operating Agreement contradicts the plain and 
simple meaning of its terms. The undisputed facts are that 
Bennett was never employed by ME&LS. ME&LS has never had 
any employees. He resigned his employment from a totally 
separate and independent company, MEI. Plaintiffs are 
asking the Court to ignore the plain language of the 
Operating Agreement and rule that upon his resignation from 
MEI he withdrew from ME&LS which is a wholly different 
entity. This transparent attempt to apply terms of the 
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ME&LS Operating Agreement to MEI is without support in any 
documents related to either of these entities. 
Because Dale Bennett was not employed by and did not 
resign employment from ME&LS, his membership interests and 
ownership rights in ME&LS could not have been affected by 
his August 2005 resignation from MEI under the very clear 
and carefully crafted provisions of the ME&LS Operating 
Agreement or under the provisions of any document related 
to MEI. Plaintiffs' argument would require the Court to 
ignore the plain language of the Operating Agreement. 
ME&LS is a manager-managed limited liability company. 
Its members include Bennett, McNeil and four other persons. 
MEI is, and always has been, owned solely by McNeil. The 
ME&LS Operating Agreement is the governing document for 
this company. Section 1.10 of the Operating Agreement 
defines "Company" as "McNeil Engineering and Land 
Surveying." This definition is determinative of the 
question of law before the Court. Plaintiffs want the 
Court to overlook this very clear definition and create, 
then import into the Operating Agreement, provisions that 
have no basis in fact, or in usual or customary use, or in 
any document related to either of these entities. Those 
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documents crafted by McNeil say what they say and are not 
subject to manipulation by McNeil to suit his present 
interests. 
The parties do not dispute that the provisions of 
Amendment No. 2 to the ME&LS Operating Agreement pertaining 
to the dissociation of a member govern Bennett's membership 
status in ME&LS. It is also uncontested that under Section 
12.1 of Amendment No. 2, a person ceases to be a member if 
that member terminates employment or withdraws as a member. 
Section 12.3 (a) provides: 
"For purposes of this Section, a Member shall be 
deemed to withdraw when the Member voluntarily 
resigns or terminates the Member's employment with 
the Company for reasons other than bankruptcy, 
death, disability or incompetency." 
(Emphasis added.) However, at no time has Bennett 
terminated or withdrawn as a member of ME&LS. His status 
and his role as a member and manager of ME&LS must not be 
confused with his role as an employee of MEI. 
POINT III. THE RELEVANT LANGUAGE OF THE OPERATING AGREEMENT 
IS NOT AMBIGUOUS AND THE INTENTIONS OF THE 
PARTIES ARE CLEAR FROM A PLAIN READING OF THE 
OPERATING AGREEMENT. 
The interpretation of a contract begins with the 
examination of the contract" itself. See Utah Transit 
Authority v. Salt Lake City Southern R.R. Co., Inc., 2006 
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UT App 46, 131 P.3d 288 ("When interpreting a contract, a 
court first looks to the contract's four corners to 
determine the parties intentions, which are 
controlling.")(quotations and citations omitted)); Trolley 
Square Associates v. Nielson, 886 P. 2d 61, 63 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) (same). "If the contract is in writing and its 
language is not ambiguous, the parties' intentions should 
be determined from the words of the agreement." Turner v. 
Hi-Country Homeowners Association, 910 P.2d 1223, 1225-26 
(Utah 1996); see also ELM, Inc. v. M.T. Enterprises, Inc., 
968 P.2d 861 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)(holding that if a 
contract's terms are clear and unambiguous, the court must 
construe the writing according to its plain and ordinary 
meaning). "When the contract is not ambiguous, the court 
may not look beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
terms therein," Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 
M.D., 2005 UT App 92, 110 P.3d 168. 
Section 12.3(a) of the ME&LS Operating Agreement is not 
ambiguous. The plain and ordinary meaning of its terms are 
not contested here. To constitute a withdrawal as a 
member, paragraph 12.3(a). requires that the member 
voluntarily resign or terminate his employment with "the 
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Company." This provision could arguably be ambiguous if 
the term "Company" was not a defined term in the Operating 
Agreement. "Company", however, is defined only as McNeil 
Engineering and Land Surveying. Therefore, the "plain and 
ordinary meaning" of the terms are that in order to be a 
withdrawing member, the member must voluntarily resign or 
terminate his employment with ME&LS. That simply has never 
happened in this case because Bennett has never been an 
employee of ME&LS. He has not resigned or terminated an 
employment he has never had nor has he withdrawn so there 
could have been no effect on his membership. 
Bennett stated in his August 17, 2005 letter of 
resignation, "I therefore resign as an employee of McNeil 
Engineering, Inc." Thus, Bennett was always employed by, 
and only resigned his employment from MEI, not from ME&LS. 
A plain and simple interpretation of the ME&LS Operating 
Agreement is that Dale Bennett is still a member of ME&LS 
because he has not withdrawn as a member pursuant to the 
clearly defined terms of the Operating Agreement and his 
letter of resignation. 
6 
POINT IV. PLAINTIFFS' POSITION IGNORES THE CLEAR LANGUAGE 
OF THE OPERATING AGREEMENT AND UNNECESSARILY 
RELIES ON IRRELEVANT FACTS OUTSIDE THE OPERATING 
AGREEMENT. 
Plaintiffs ask the Court to look beyond the plain 
meaning of the terms of the Operating Agreement and 
conclude that Bennett is no longer a member of ME&LS 
because his August 17, 2005 "'resignation" from MEI was "in 
effect" also a "withdrawal" from ME&LS. This strained 
attempt to write new and wholly unsupported terms into the 
ME&LS Operating Agreement is patently wrong. See Utah 
Transit Authority, 2006 UT App 46 at 5 12 (stating that to 
merit consideration, an alternative interpretation must be 
based upon the usual and natural meaning of the language 
used and may not be the result of a forced or strained 
construction). 
Plaintiffs' argument cannot succeed because they 
attempt to interpret the Operating Agreement using terms 
that are nowhere found within it. MEI, Bennett's employer, 
is not mentioned anywhere in the ME&LS Operating Agreement. 
Bennett's resignation from MEI can have no impact on his 
ownership interests in ME&LS. Bennett's membership rights 
in ME&LS stand separate and apart from his status as an 
employee of MEI. 
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The fact that Bennett was one of many employees leased 
by MEI to ME&LS is immaterial to the question before the 
Court. Because Bennett was employed by MEI, he could have 
been leased to any or all of the three McNeil LLCs, or he 
could have remained as an employee of MEI itself, or ME&LS 
could have leased employees from another employee leasing 
company. To whom MEI chose to lease Bennett is not 
relevant to the interpretation of the ME&LS Operating 
Agreement. Plaintiffs' argument that Bennett's close day-
to-day association with ME&LS somehow changed his actual 
employment status and therefore the meaning of the express 
terms of the Operating Agreement must be rejected. 
Plaintiffs are distorting the undisputed facts about 
Bennett's employment in order to deprive him of his right 
as a member of ME&LS. 
POINT V. PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF THE CLEAR LANGUAGE OF THE 
OPERATING AGREEMENT DOES NOT LEAD TO ABSURD 
RESULTS OR TO NULLIFICATION OF ITS TERMS. 
Plaintiffs claim that any interpretation of Section 
12.3 of the Operating Agreement, other than their own, 
would necessarily "nullify" its terms and lead to "absurd" 
results. A review of that section, however, demonstrates 
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that such is not the case. Section 12.3 provides in 
material part that: 
"A member shall be deemed to withdraw when the 
member voluntarily resigns or terminates the 
member's employment with the Company . . ." 
To begin with, ME&LS and the other two companies had 
the ability, never invoked, to hire employees of their own 
to perform the same services as those that were being 
performed by leased employees of MEI. Thus the word 
employment clearly would have application had ME&LS 
decided, or should it at some point decide, to hire its own 
employees. The word termination cannot be applied to 
Bennett as a member or as a manager of ME&LS because he did 
not either voluntarily resign or terminate as to ME&LS. 
His only termination was as an employee from a wholly 
different entity, MEI. Thus, plaintiffs' claim that his 
resignation as an employee of MEI triggered his withdrawal 
from ME&LS is nonsensical. 
Plaintiffs refuse to acknowledge the simple fact that 
under usual, accepted and customary business practice, the 
role, rights and duties of an "employee" of a corporation 
differ markedly from the role, rights and duties of a 
"member" of an LLC. Plaintiffs do not want to recognize 
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that under usual and customary practice, the resignation of 
an "employee" from a corporation has no effect on the 
employee's position as a "member" of a clearly distinct and 
different entity, an LLC. Plaintiffs also refuse to 
acknowledge that under the usual and customary business 
practices, employees of an employee leasing company do not 
become employees of the company that leases their services 
from their employer simply because services for the leasing 
company's client are provided by the leasing company's 
leased employees. This is so even though these services 
benefit their employer's client. Nor is there a limitation 
on the kinds, quality, or volume of work a leased employee 
can perform for his employer's clients. 
It is a simple fact that employee leasing companies 
lease their employees to perform services for their 
employer on work undertaken for clients of their employer, 
often at the client's place of business. And leased 
employees of a given leasing company often perform such 
services for multiple clients. That fact does not make 
them employees of each of the leasing company's clients. 
As applied to this case, that relationship has existed 
where Bennett, as an employee of MEI, the employee leasing 
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company, directed the work of MEI's other employees to 
perform the work for MEI on engineering and surveying 
projects of MEI's client, ME&LS. The work of both Bennett 
and the other MEI employees was for their employer MEI who 
was by that means meeting its obligation to perform on 
projects of its client, ME&LS. That didn't make them 
employees of ME&LS. Under plaintiffs' construction, where 
a leasing company's leased employees worked on different 
projects for multiple clients it would make them employees 
of each such client. That result would indeed be absurd. 
And if, as plaintiffs claim, Bennett became the employee of 
ME&LS, was he also at the same time still an employee of 
MEI? That result would also be absurd. 
The case Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board of Review, 
111 P.2d 1110 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cited by ME&LS, is 
highly instructive under the facts of the present case to 
confirm that ME&LS was not the employer of Bennett. 
In that case, Pro-Benefit Staffing merely 
. . . calculated the client's payroll, cut checks 
for wages and taxes drawn on its account and 
delivered paychecks to client for distribution to 
employees in return for a check from client for 
amount of payroll plus its fee and which 
designated owner of client business as "on-site" 
supervisor, lacked requisite decision-making power 
to qualify as an "employer". 
11 
Id. 
In the present case, it cannot be truthfully claimed 
that "the requisite decision-making power to qualify as an 
employer did not in fact rest in MEI and its sole owner, 
Scott McNeil." 
In that case 
[t]he net result of the formal maneuvering via the 
contract between Pro-Benefit and the Client is 
little different, as a practical matter, from the 
situation that existed before Pro-Benefit became 
involved, except that Pro-Benefit handles payroll, 
employee benefits, and a few other personnel-
related administrative matters. 
As noted supra, the employment arrangements after the 
reorganization in 1996 did not change the arrangement that 
had existed since 1983 wherein MEI and Scott McNeil had and 
exercised all decision making authority. 
The Court there concluded: 
Applying those factors to this case, it is 
apparent that Pro-Benefit lacks the requisite 
decision-making power to qualify as an employer. 
The supervision by Pro-Benefit is, as the appeal 
referee found, merely the "facade of control." The 
"on-site supervisor" designated by Pro-Benefit is 
the Client's owner or manager, who does not look 
to Pro-Benefit for instructions in running the 
business or even communicate with Pro-Benefit, 
except to notify Pro-Benefit of information needed 
to perform administrative and clerical functions. 
As a practical matter, it is the Client's owner or 
12 
manager who performs all of the following elements 
of the employer's role: 
1. Directs the work and specifies the manner and 
method of accomplishing it. 
2. Trains the employees in how to perform the 
work. 
3. Determines if, when, and which employees will 
be hired, dismissed, or laid off. 
4. Determines rates of pay and the availability 
of employee benefits. 
5. Assigns tasks; schedules hours of work and 
vacations. 
6. Directs and leads the employees in the general 
conduct of the Client's business activities. 
These elements describe the role and authority of MEI 
and McNeil in the present case. 
POINT VI. PLAINTIFFS' ATTEMPT TO RESTRUCTURE THE OPERATING 
AGREEMENT, WITHOUT NOTICE TO BENNETT, IS INVALID 
AND A VIOLATION OF JUDGE BOYDEN'S PREVIOUSLY 
ANNOUNCED ORDER. 
It is significant that plaintiffs' statement of 
material facts does not include or even refer to ME&LS 
Amendment No. 4 that was adopted November 29, 2006, without 
notice to Bennett. That Amendment purports to eliminate 
Bennett's membership interest and apportion the same among 
McNeil and the other members of ME&LS. This attempt to 
write off and appropriate Bennett's membership came after, 
and was in direct violation of, Judge Boyden's ruling. 
13 
Within twelve (12) days following Judge Boyden's 
ruling, and in clear violation of the terms and effect of 
that ruling, McNeil deliberately proceeded, unilaterally, 
and without any notice to the Court or to Bennett, to 
retroactively restructure the Operating Agreement to 
terminate and appropriate Bennett's valuable membership 
interest. 
Without permission of the Court on the very matter that 
was pending before the Court for resolution, and without 
notice to Bennett, plaintiffs added new terms to the 
Operating Agreement to accomplish what the Court had denied 
and what they have claimed was already provided in the 
Agreement before that amendment was adopted. If plaintiffs 
truly believed their interpretation of the Operating 
Agreement was valid, they would not have needed to provide 
in Amendment No. 4 what they claim was already provided 
under the existing terms of the Operating Agreement. These 
actions show contempt for Judge Boyden's ruling and also 
demonstrate the lengths to which McNeil will go to damage 
Bennett financially. 
Rather than show respect for the Court's ruling and 
pursue a proper course to seek a reversal, the plaintiffs, 
14 
unilaterally and without notice, took prompt action to 
overrule and void that ruling retroactively by self help. 
And despite that ruling the plaintiffs have still refused 
to accord any of those member's rights to Bennett. They 
still have refused to pay distributions or give Bennett any 
required notice of their attempted manipulation of ME&LS' 
core documents. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order of Judge Boyden confirmed by Judge Brian, the 
Order of Judgment of Judge Brian, and the Order to Enforce 
Judgment of Judge Dever, should be affirmed. 
DATED this J^yU day of J4<^a^eAx^', 2011. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By: 
Reed L. Martineau 
Keith A. Call 
Derek J. Williams 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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DAVIS, Judge: 
Appellant McNeil Engineering and Land Surveying, LLC (ME&LS) 
filed suit against Appellee Dale K. Bennett for various claims, 
and Bennett asserted several counterclaims. The parties 
eventually filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue 
of whether Bennett's employment resignation from McNeil 
Engineering, Inc. triggered his withdrawal as a member of ME&LS. 
The district court determined that Bennett did not withdraw as a 
member of ME&LS and was therefore due his share of disbursements. 
ME&LS filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district 
court denied. The district court then, on Bennett's motion, 
determined there was "no just reason for delaying entry of 
judgment as requested by Bennett" for his share of cash 
distributions. ME&LS now appeals. 
The threshold issue before us is whether we have subject 
matter jurisdiction to address the other issues that the parties 
raise on appeal, that is, we must first determine whether the 
order being appealed from was properly certified for appeal under 
rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Although the 
parties assert that this case is properly before us via a rule 
54(b) certification, this consensus is not dispositive. 
"'Acquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer 
jurisdiction and . . . a lack of jurisdiction can be raised at 
any time by either party or by the court. f,f Kennecott Corp. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1100 (Utah 1991) (omission 
in original) (quoting Olson v. Salt Lake Citv Sch. Dist., 724 
P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986)). 
Rule 54 (b) of the Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure provides as 
follows: 
When more than one claim for relief is 
presented in an action, whether as a claim, 
counterclaim, or third-party claim, and/or 
when multiple parties are involved, the court 
may direct the entry of a final judgment as 
to one or more but fewer than all of the 
claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no 
just reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of judgment. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Utah Supreme Court has further 
elaborated on the requirements of certification under rule 54 (b): 
First, there must be multiple claims for 
relief or multiple parties to the action. 
Second, the judgment appealed from must have 
been entered on an order that would be 
appealable but for the fact that other claims 
or parties remain in the action. Third, the 
trial court, in its discretion, must make a 
determination that there is no just reason 
for delay of the appeal. 
Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1984) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, 
proper certification under rule 54 (b) does not occur when the 
district court simply directs that judgment be entered and makes 
the order final. See id. at 768. The district court must 
additionally determine "whether there was any just reason for 
delaying the appeal. If it found none, it would then be free to 
enter such a certification, permitting the appeal to proceed." 
Id. Neither of these two determinations alone is sufficient for 
certification under rule 54 (b): 
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We must emphasize that all of these 
requirements must be met. An order that is 
"final*1 as to a claim or a party in a multi-
claim or multi-party suit is appealable under 
Rule 54 (b) only if it is accompanied by a 
district court certification that no just 
reason exists for delaying the appeal; an 
order that does not wholly dispose of a claim 
or a party is not "final" under Rule 54(b) 
and will not be appealable, even with such a 
certification. 
Id. (emphasis added).x 
The parties argue that the district court properly certified 
this case under rule 54(b) because the court's Order and Judgment 
stated, "The Court finds that there is no just reason for 
delaying entry of judgment as requested by Bennett." Although 
this reflects the district court's determination that the Order 
was a final order, it is unclear whether the court meant the 
Order was a final order for purposes of 54(b).2 Moreover, the 
• • • * • • * ' • ' - * • - - • • • 
district courts have been directed to provide findings 
supporting both the determination that a judgment is final under 
rule 54 (b) and the determination that there is no just reason for 
delay of the appeal. See Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137, 
139 (Utah 1992) ("In order to facilitate this courtTs review of 
judgments certified as final under rule 54(b), trial courts 
should henceforth enter findings supporting the conclusion that 
such orders are final.")/ id. ("[T]his court has yet to see a 
single instance where a trial court has advanced a rationale as 
to why there was no just reason for delay. Because this 
determination by the trial court is subject to judicial review 
under an abuse of discretion standard, a brief explanation should 
accompany all future certifications so that this court may render 
an informed decision on that question."). 
2Under the facts of this case, that determination would be 
inappropriate in any event. The approach adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court "requires that before a claim can be considered 
separate, the facts underlying it must be different than those 
underlying other claims in the action." Kennecott Corp. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1991). Thus, to 
determine whether an issue certified for appeal is separate from 
the issues remaining in district court, we "focus [] on the degree 
of factual overlap between [the issues]. When this factual 
overlap is such that separate claims appear to be based on the 
same operative facts or on the same operative facts with minor 
variations, they are held not to constitute separate claims for 
(continued...) 
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Order lacks an accompanying determination that there is no just 
reason for delay in bringing an appeal. This conclusion is 
underscored by the following exchange at the hearing on Bennett's 
motion to enforce the prior summary judgment ruling: 
[ME&LS's counsel]: And I presume that 
order is going to make the--state the 
language under Rule 54(b) that it's--there's 
an express determination of final judgment. 
I think that's what they were Asking for. 
[Bennett!s counsel]: Your Honor, we 
simply requested a judgment. We didn't 
request that it be certifiable so it could be 
appealed on an interlocutory basis. 
THE COURT: The Court simply granted the 
relief prayed for in the motion, and orders 
counsel for [Bennett] to so reflect in the 
order. 
All right, next matter. 
[ME&LS's counsel]: I'm sorry, Your 
Honor. I have to ask for some clarification, 
because I'm at a loss here. [Their] moving 
papers did ask for a final judgment, and the 
Court is entering a ruling that is, in fact, 
a final judgment. You ['re] ordering my 
client to make payment by a date certain. 
THE COURT: Is counsel not correct? 
That was the specific relief that defense 
counsel sought, and the specific relief the 
Court granted. 
[BennettTs counsel]* We sought a 
judgment--an order of judgment in that 
amount, Your Honor. We did not specifically 
request that it be certified as [a] final 
order for--as a final judgment for purposes 
of appeal. So I don't know what--exactly 
2
 (. ..continued) 
rule 54(b) purposes." Id. (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). Here, where the majority, if not all, of the 
issues in this case are related to Bennett's resignation and the 
events surrounding it, and where there remains pending an ME&LS 
claim that Bennett breached the operating agreement, there is 
factual overlap between the claim before us and claims pending in 
the district court. 
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what weTre asking for here. We wanted a 
judgment that we could collect upon. Your 
Honor, has ruled that the payment is to be 
made, and--
THE COURT: Cite the specific language 
in your motion regarding the relief sought, 
and that is the order of the Court--whatever 
the specific language of your motion reads. 
The district court therefore clearly made no determination as to 
whether there was any just reason for delaying an appeal but 
simply granted Bennett*s motion, which requested only "an order 
of judgment for Bennett's share of member distributions."3 Thus, 
there was no proper certification under rule 54(b), and we do not 
have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the issues raised in 
this appeal. 
"When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it 
retains only the authority to dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac, 
Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). We 
therefore dismiss the appeal. 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
William A. Thome Jr., 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
3Bennett1s motion was devoid of the "no just reason for 
delay" language but instead stated, "There is no reason the Court 
cannot enter a judgment against ME&LS for this amount and order 
that Plaintiffs pay Bennett this amount." Bennett1s supporting 
memorandum used language closer to that of rule 54 (b), stating, 
"Bennett is entitled to this judgment based upon the Court's 
prior ruling and there is no just cause for delaying the entry of 
this judgment." Neither filing, however, requested the court to 





SEP 2 3 2010 
Richards. Brandt 
Miller & Nelson SEP 11 20t0 
: r ,-MAKE COON-" 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
McNEiL ENGINEERING, INC., McNEIL 
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SURVEYING, LLC, and, SCOTT 
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CAD SERVICES, LAND 
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Case No. 050917315 
Judge: L.A. DEVSR 
The above entitled matter is before the Court on Defendants' Notice to Submit for 
Decision their Motion to Enforce Judgment and Motion for Leave to (1) Serve Third Set 
of Interrogatories, (2) File Fourth Request for Production of Documents, and (3) Take 
Second 30(b)(6) Deposition, filed July 21,2010. The Court having reviewed 
Defendants' Motions and Plaintiffs' Opposition thereto, and being duly advised in the 
premises of each, makes the following ruling. 
Defendants' Motion to Enforce Judgment 
Defendants request the Court to enforce the April 3,2008, Order and Judgment 
issued by the Honorable Pat Brian. The Order and Judgment entered in favor of 
Defendant Dale K. Bennett ("Bennett") in the amount of $142,174.93. On April 21, 
2008, the parties stipulated a joint motion to stay the pending trial while Plaintiffs 
appealed in part, the Court's Order entered December 21, 2006, which ruled that 
Bennett is a member of ME&LS and an Order entered April 2, 2008, which denied 
reconsideration of the December 21,2006, ruling. 
Pursuant to the terms of the April 21, 2008, stipulation Bennett agreed that the 
stay of any execution of the Order and Judgment may be entered without the need to 
post a supersedeas bond. On May 21, 2009, the Court of Appeals dismissed Plaintiffs' 
appeal for failure to show certification of the finality of the trial court's order. A remittitur 
was entered on August 10,2009. 
Defendants now seek enforcement of the April 3, 2008, Order and Judgment as 
the basis for the earlier stipulation no longer apply. 
This Court finds the following explanation regarding such matters helpful in its 
consideration: 
[T]he "law of the case" doctrine is employed to avoid delay and to 
prevent injustice. "The purpose of [this] doctrine is that in the interest of 
economy of time and efficiency of procedure, It is desirable to avoid the 
delays and the difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and rulings 
upon the same propositions in the same case." Richardson v. Grand 
Central Corp.. 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977). See Conderv.A. L 
Williams &ASS0C8.. Inc.. 739 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
"Although a trial court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents, prior 
relevant rulings made in the same case are generally to be followed." 
People ex, rel. Gallagher v. District Court. 666 P.2d 550, 553 (Colo. 1983). 
2 
The law of the case doctrine is particularly applicable when, in the 
case of summary judgment, a subsequent motion fails to present the case 
in a different light, such as when no new, material evidence is introduced. 
Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil Inc.. 692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984); 
Richardson v. Grand Central Corp.. 572 P.2d at 397; Hammer v. Gibbons 
& Reed Co.. 29 Utah 2d 415, 510 P.2d 1104,1105 (Utah 1973). 
Salt Lake Citv Corp. v» James Constructors. 761 P.2d 42,45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
Upon review of the case, the Order and Judgment issued on April 3,2008, was 
intended to serve as the final order on Defendants' counterclaim for declaratory relief. 
See e.g. Pasauin v. Pasauin. 1999 UT App 245, f12, 988 P.2d 1 ("In this case, the 
October 21 Order was properly certified because it granted summary judgment for all 
claims against the Estate* Further, the trial court also made the required finding that 
there was 'no just reason for delay/ and expressly ordered the entry of judgment as 
required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).") 
Similarly, Judge Brian's Court found "that there is no just reason for delaying 
entry of judgment as requested by Bennett.w The Order and Judgment was entered into 
the Registry of Judgments on April 9, 2008. 
Accordingly, it is HEREBY ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Order and 
Judgment, issued and entered on April 3,2008, is a final order on Defendants' 
counterclaim for declaratory relief. 
Defendants' Motion for Leave 
Defendants' seek leave from this Court to continue certain discovery proceedings 
because of Plaintiffs1 alleged actions which are contrary to the ruling of the Honorable 
3 
Ann Boyden. Specifically, while Judge Boyden declared in a ruling issued November 
17,2006, that Bennett was entitled to all of the rights of other ME&LS members, 
Plaintiffs have allegedly been acting contrary to this ruling by failing to provide Bennett 
with information he is claimed to be entitled to including: tax returns, financial 
statements, disbursements of any kind to other members, etc. 
Defendants fail to present any viable legal argument and analysis to the Court 
that would address their claimed entitlement to additional discovery in light of a final 
ruling on Bennett's claim for declaratory relief and dismissal of his accounting claim on 
January 29,2008. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motion for Leave. 
This Ruling serves as the Order of the Court. No further order is required. 
Dated 21st day of September, 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
McNEIL ENGINEERING, INC; McNEIL 
ENGINEERING AND LAND SURVEYING, 
LLC; and SCOTT McNEIL, an individual, 
Plaintiffs and Counterclaim 
Defendants, 
vs. 
BENCHMARK ENGINEERING AND 
LAND SURVEYING, LLC; BENCHMARK 
CAD SERVICES, LLC; LAND 
DEVELOPMENT CADD, INC; and 
DALE K. BENNETT, an individual; 
FLORENCE B. ALHAMBRA, an individual, 
Defendants and Counter Claimants. 
AMENDED ORDER CERTIFYING 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT AS FINAL 
Civil No. 050917315 
Judge L.A. Dever 
TS&SSSgr 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Motion to Alter or Amend Order 
filed by Plaintiff McNeil Engineering and Land Surveying, LLC ("ME&LS") on October 1,2010, 
and also the Motion for Certification That The April 3, 2008 Order and Judgment is Final for 
Purposes of Rule 54(b) and for Appeal, recently filed by the Defendants. Based on the foregoing, the 
Court hereby finds and ORDERS as follows: 
1. An Order and Judgment was entered in this case by the Honorable Pat Brian of 
the Third District Court for Salt Lake County on April 3,2008. 
2. ME&LS filed a Notice of Appeal on April 8,2008. 
3. The Utah Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision on May 25,2009 
ruling that the Order and Judgment were not final for purposes of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals specified certain language to be used when the District Court 
certifies an order as final. Additionally, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court must make 
a determination that the operative facts underlying the claims to be appealed are separate and distinct 
from those on which the remaining claims are based. 
4. This Court issued a Minute Entry on September 21, 2010 finding that the 
"Order and Judgment, issued and entered on April 3, 2008, is a final order on Defendants' 
counterclaim for declaratory relief." The Minute Entry was intended to be the Order of the Court. 
5. This Order modifies the Minute Entry and is intended to certify the Order and 
Judgment as final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 54(b), 
this Court makes the express direction for entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than 
2 
all of the claims or parties in this action. The Court hereby determines that the Order and Judgment 
entered April 3,2008 was and is intended to be final under Rule 54(b). The Court also determines 
that there is no just reason for delaying an appeal from the Order and Judgment. 
6. This Court also makes the determination that the operative facts underlying 
the adjudicated claims are separate and distinct from those underlying the claims which remain in the 
District Court. The operative facts relating to Bennett's Counterclaim, in this action on which the 
Order and Judgment is based, are summarized as follows: 
a. The language of the ME&LS Operating Agreement and its 
amendments. 
b. The history of ME&LS and its relationship with McNeil 
Engineering, Inc. ("MEI"). 
c. The voluntary nature of Bennett's resignation. 
d. The payments to members and the changes of ownership in 
ME&LS after Bennett's resignation. 
7. By contrast, the claims of the Plaintiffs which remain in the District Court are 
based upon a distinctly different set of operative facts, which are summarized as follows: 
a. Bennett's subsequent establishment of a competing 
engineering firm, and whether his conduct before and after 
departure breached duties to ME&LS or the Operating 
Agreement of ME&LS. 
b. Bennett's interactions with the Engcad entities set up to 
outsource drafting work to the Philippines, and whether his 
conduct interfered with ME&LS' business relationship with 
Engcad or breached duties to Engcad. 
c. Bennett's subsequent use of ME&LS' design practices, tools, 
and procedures, and whether such conduct is a 
misappropriation of trade secrets, 
d. Whether the logo and slogan of Bennett's new company 
infringe upon the rights of ME&LS and MEI. 
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8. Based on the foregoing, this Courl certifies the Order and Judgment ofApril 3. 
2008 as final for all purposes under Rule 54(b). as described above. 
IT IS SO ORDERI-D. 
DATKD this _^Jday of October. 2010. 
BY Till-COURT: 
HOltoRABUiJ^U^VER. 
THIRD DIsftfTCT COURTJUDGl: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SNOW CI IRISTI-NSEN & MARTINr-AU 
Attorneys for Dcfemlcmlx 
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